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HOOKER CHEMICALS: CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR
TO INTERVENORS
CHARLES P. Fox*
Congress recently amended' the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (RCRA)2 to allow for "citizen suits," and intervention by private
individuals or groups under the imminent hazard provision of the Act. 3
Prior to these amendments, federal courts had been divided over the is-
sue of whether citizen suits, and intervention were authorized under this
provision of RCRA.
4
Intervention is a procedural device whereby an individual or group
may become either a party plaintiff or a defendant to a suit. A person
may move to intervene of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) or with per-
mission under Rule 24(b). Intervention of right, which is at issue in this
* B.A., History, Washington University, 1983; Candidate for J.D., lIT Chicago-Kent, May,
1986. I dedicate this article to Anne Rapkin, a teacher and an environmentalist.
1. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 3221. A number of articles have discussed the RCRA amendments
with some discussion of the new provision which explicitly allows intervention in imminent hazard
suits. However, it should be noted that the amendments also preclude citizen suits with respect to
siting and issuance of permits for hazardous waste facilities. Rosbe and Gulley, The Hazardous and
Solid Waste Amendments of 1984: A Dramatic Overhaul of the Way America Manages Its Hazardous
Wastes, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10458, 10466-67 (Dec. 1984); Weissman, National
L.J. Dec. 17, 1984, at 28, col. 2.
2. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6991i (1983 & West Supp. 1985). 42 U.S.C.A. § 6973(a) (West Supp.
1985), as amended states in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, upon receipt of evidence that the past
or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid waste or
hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment, the Administrator may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the appro-
priate district court against any person (including any past or present generator, past or
present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or dispo-
sal facility) who has contributed or who is contributing to such handling, storage, treat-
ment, transportation or disposal to restrain such person from such handling, storage,
treatment, transportation or disposal, to order such person to take such other action as
may be necessary ...
3. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985), as amended states in relevant part:
(E) In any action under subsection (a)(l)(B) [the imminent hazard section] of this section
in a court of the United States, any person may intervene as a matter of right when the
applicant claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and he is so situated that
the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest, unless the Administrator or the State shows that the applicant's inter-
est is adequately represented by existing parties.
For the provision allowing citizen suits, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(a)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 1985).
4. Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (citizen suit allowed); see also
United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982). Contra City of
Gallatin v. Cherokee County, 563 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Tex. 1983); United States v. Midwest Solvent
Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
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case, provides for a person to intervene "when a statute of the United
States confers an unconditional right to intervene," or when a three-part
test is satisfied. The test requires a showing that: (1) the applicant
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the action; (2) the applicant for intervention is so situated that
the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede
his ability to protect that interest; and, (3) the applicant's interest is not
adequately represented by existing parties. 5 Assuming that the first two
criteria have been met, most courts will allow intervention on a minimal
showing that the present parties to a suit "may be" inadequate
representatives.
6
The amendment to RCRA authorizing intervention is almost identi-
cal to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Thus, even though the legislative history
of the amendment is silent on the proper standard for courts to apply in
determining when to allow intervention, 7 the standards governing the ap-
plication of Rule 24(a)(2) should guide the courts as they rule on peti-
tions for intervention under RCRA.
In spite of a well settled body of case law construing Rule 24(a)(2),
the rule presents peculiar difficulties when the government represents the
proposed intervenor's interests. The courts are divided as to the proper
standard to apply when a party seeks to intervene pursuant to Rule
24(a)(2) in an action brought by the government in its capacity as parens
patriae.8 Some courts have held that when the government brings an
action as parens patriae, it "is presumed to represent the interests of all
its citizens." 9 These courts have required the applicant for intervention
to demonstrate "a strong affirmative showing that the sovereign is not
fairly representing the interests of the applicant." 10 Other courts have
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
6. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972) and infra text accompanying
note 50.
7. The legislative history contains detailed explanations of the new citizen suit provision but
says nothing about the provision authorizing intervention. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5576, 5688-89.
8. The Supreme Court in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), applied the
doctrine of patens patriae to afford a State standing to sue. The Court stated that "[tihis is a suit by
a State for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain." Id. at
237; see also Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900). See generally, Note, State Protection of Its
Economy and Environment, 6 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 411, 412-13 (1970).
9. Environmental Defense Fund v. Higginson, 631 F.2d 738, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per
curiam); see also New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 690 F.2d 1203, 1213 &
n.7 (5th Cir. 1982), dismissed in part on rehearing en banc, 732 F.2d 452 (5th Cir.) (denied interven-
tion of public officials), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 434 (1984); Delaware Valley Citizens' Counsel v.
Pennsylvania, 674 F.2d 970, 973-74 (3d Cir. 1982).
10. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 985 (2d Cir. 1984).
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looked beyond the label of parens patriae, and required the same minimal
showing of inadequate representation usually required for intervention. I
In United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. ,12 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals denied the motion of four local environmental
groups to intervene, under Rule 24(a)(2), in a RCRA imminent hazard
enforcement action brought by the United States as parens patriae.' 3 In
denying the groups' motion for intervention, the court followed the line
of cases requiring a strong showing of inadequate representation. The
Hooker Chemicals construction of Rule 24(a)(2) in the context of this
RCRA enforcement action may be persuasive in subsequent decisions.
That is, since the amendments to RCRA essentially incorporate the same
language as Rule 24(a)(2), courts may apply a similar standard to mo-
tions to intervene under the amended Act.
This case comment will examine in detail those cases which have
required a strong showing of inadequate representation when the govern-
ment sues as parens patriae. This comment will also examine the oppos-
ing line of cases that have required only a minimal showing of
inadequacy for intervention in such suits. It will then present and ana-
lyze the Hooker Chemicals decision and its likely impact on future liti-
gants as they seek to intervene in RCRA imminent hazard suits brought
by the government. It will conclude that requiring a strong showing of
inadequate representation will prevent groups or individuals from inter-
vening under RCRA.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
Pennsylvania v. Rizzo14 originated the requirement that a proposed
intervenor must demonstrate a strong showing of inadequate representa-
tion to intervene in an action brought by the government as parens pa-
triae. At issue in Rizzo were certain policies and practices governing
hiring and promotion of Philadelphia firefighters. These policies and
practices were alleged to be discriminatory towards black firefighters.
Several white firemen, who would be affected by any changes in the pro-
motion policies, moved to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) as defendants.' 5
The court affirmed the dismissal of the motion to intervene as untimely,
11. National Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977); National
Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 99 F.R.D. 607 (D.D.C. 1983); United States v. Reserve Mining
Co., 56 F.R.D. 408 (D. Minn. 1972).
12. 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984).
13. Id. at 992.
14. 530 F.2d 501 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, Fire Officers Union v. Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. 921
(1976).
15. Id. at 502-03.
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and noted as a matter of dicta that "[w]here official policies and practices
are challenged, it seems unlikely that anyone could be better situated to
defend than the governmental department involved and its officers."'
16
From this narrow statement of dicta, subsequent cases have erected
the parens patriae presumption of adequate representation. The leading
case following Rizzo was Environmental Defense Fund v. Higginson.17 In
Higginson, the Environmental Defense Fund and two other environmen-
tal groups sued the Department of Interior to force it to prepare a com-
prehensive environmental impact statement (CEIS). This CEIS would
force the government to analyze the impacts of and alternatives to federal
water resource projects and operations in the Colorado River Basin. The
court found that four states in the Basin had the right to intervene, but
four local water districts in Colorado and one in Nevada did not have
such a right. The district court held that the local water districts could
not intervene in the suit because they had not overcome the presumption
that Nevada and Colorado, acting as parens patriae, were adequate
representatives. 18
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court's holding. The court recognized that normally only a minimal
burden of inadequacy must be shown to allow intervention. However,
"[u]nder the parens patriae concept... a state that is a party to a suit
involving a matter of sovereign interest is presumed to represent the in-
terests of all its citizens."' 9 In order to intervene, an applicant for inter-
vention must overcome this presumption of adequate representation.
The court concluded that the water districts had not overcome this pre-
sumption, stating that "there appears to be no possible divergence be-
tween their position and the state's position on the primary issue. All
oppose the claim that a comprehensive environmental impact statement
is required by law. The arguments of the water district would be merely
cumulative."
'20
The dissent in Higginson rejected this parens patriae presumption of
adequate representation. Instead, it focused on the scope of the interests
at issue. The dissent reasoned that if one party has only a general inter-
est in the subject matter, it should not be considered an adequate repre-
sentative for a party with a narrower or more focused interest. Applying
this standard to the facts in Higginson, the dissent concluded that the
16. Id. at 505.
17. 631 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
18. Id. at 739.
19. Id. at 740.
20. Id.
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states were not adequate representatives for the water district. 21
This line of reasoning is illustrated by National Resources Defense
Council v. Costle,22 which reached the outcome called for in the Higgin-
son dissent. In Costle, the court found that several rubber and chemical
companies had the right to intervene in a suit which would determine the
amount of water pollution that these companies could discharge.2 3
Costle reversed the district court's denial of the industry's motion to
intervene, rejecting the argument that the EPA would adequately repre-
sent their interests. The court reasoned that:
[A]s to [the] EPA, a shared general agreement with appellants that the
regulations should be lawful does not necessarily ensure agreement in
all particular respects about what the law requires .... [Moreover],
[t]here may be factual disagreement . . . on how best to modify the
timetable so as to ensure an adequate factual predicate for regulation.
Good faith disagreement, such as this, may understandably arise out of
the differing scope of EPA and appellants' interest: EPA is broadly
concerned with implementation and enforcement of the settlement
agreement, appellants are more narrowly focussed [sic] on the proceed-
ings that may affect their industries. Particular interests, then, always
'may not coincide' [citation omitted] thus justifying separate
representation.2 4
Thus, in contrast to the majority in Higginson, Costle looked beyond the
label of parens patriae and focused on the scope of the interests involved
to conclude that EPA's representation was inadequate.25 It appears that
these two conflicting lines of analysis exist simultaneously in the D.C.
Circuit.2 6 Subsequent decisions in that circuit2 7 and others28 have fol-
lowed both lines of analysis creating great uncertainty in this area of the
law.
21. Id. at 741 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
22. 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
23. Id. at 905-06.
24. Id. at 912 (emphasis added).
25. See United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 418 (D. Minn. 1972), where the
court stated that "[w]hile there may be a similarity of interests asserted between the environmental
groups and the United States, the similarity does not necessarily mean that there will be adequate
representation of those interests by the United States." See also National Resources Defense Council
v. EPA, 99 F.R.D. 607, 610 (D.D.C. 1983) (the court noted that "[t]he intervenors' interests are
more narrowly focused .... Thus, there may come a time in this action when the interests of EPA
and the intervenors diverge, and EPA's representation of the intervenors' interests becomes inade-
quate."); Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 721 (1968).
26. Compare Environmental Defense Fund v. Higginson, 631 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per
curiam) with National Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Higgin-
son cites Costle in a footnote, 631 F.2d at 740 n.6, but makes no attempt to distinguish it.
27. National Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 99 F.R.D. 607 (D.D.C. 1983), followed the
analysis articulated in Costle.
28. See cases cited supra at note 9 which all followed the Higginson line of analysis.
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FACTS OF THE CASE
On December 20, 1979, the United States filed suit against Hooker
Chemicals & Plastics Corporation, its parent corporation, an affiliated
conglomerate, and the City of Niagara Falls. Hooker joined the State of
New York as a defendant upon a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
19(a). Upon receiving permission to be realigned as a plaintiff, New
York State filed its own complaint against Hooker and the City of Niag-
ara Falls.
29
The suit arose as a result of one of the worst hazardous waste dispo-
sal sites yet discovered. 30 From 1947 to 1975, Hooker disposed of more
than 70,000 tons of hazardous chemical wastes in a four acre landfill, the
"S-area." The suit alleged that hazardous wastes had migrated from the
S-area contaminating the Niagara River and the public drinking water
supplied by the local water treatment plant. These activities allegedly
constituted "an imminent and substantial endangerment" to the environ-
ment and the "health of persons" under § 1431 of the Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA), 31 § 7003 of the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (RCRA),32 and § 504 of the Clean Water Act (CWA). 33
In October of 1980, Hooker commenced settlement negotiations
with representatives of the United States, New York State, and the City
of Niagara Falls. These negotiations proceeded continuously for more
than two years.
On July 16, 1982, Niagara Environmental Action (NEA) an envi-
ronmental group representing residents affected by the pollution, moved
to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) 34 and 24(b). 35 NEA
sought to vindicate its members' interest in the quality of the drinking
water obtained from the local water treatment facility. It claimed that
the government's suit against Hooker would impair that interest because
"[flor all practical extents and purposes, this litigation [would] determine
29. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 970 (2d Cir. 1984).
30. EPSTEIN, BROWN & POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA 89-132 (1982).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a) (1982).
32. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6973 (West Supp. 1985) for the text of this provision see supra note 2. This
case comment will limit its analysis to intervention under this provision only.
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (1982).
34. For a discussion of the text of Rule 24(a) see supra text accompanying note 5.
35. The relevant portions of this rule provide that:
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to inter-
vene in an action:
(1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or
(2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law
or fact in common.
The court did not consider claims under this provision on appeal.
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the final nature of any necessary remedial program at the S-area dump
site and surrounding areas including the City of Niagara Falls Drinking
Water Treatment Plant."' 36 Furthermore, the motion to intervene al-
leged that the present parties did not and would not adequately represent
NEA's health and safety interests. In support of this allegation, NEA
filed an affidavit averring a "lack of assiduity by the United States, [New
York] State and [the] City [of Niagara Falls] in monitoring the water
entering the Plant and in effecting closure of an allegedly contaminated
intake line."' 37 In addition, the affidavit averred that the plaintiffs had
refused to seriously consider the possibility of relocating the plant. Later
that year, oral argument was heard on NEA's motion but no decision
was rendered.
On March 21, 1983, Ecumenical Task Force (ETF), Pollution Probe
Foundation (PPF) and Operation Clean Niagara (OCN), all locally
based environmental groups, the latter two being from Ontario, also
moved to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) and 24(b).
38
Each of the groups alleged an interest in the suit because its members
were threatened by contaminated drinking water and tainted fish from
Lake Ontario. The groups claimed that the suit might impair their inter-
ests because it would effectively preclude later judicial action, and the
possibility that "improper remediation could 'exacerbate existing migra-
tion by opening new and additional pathways for chemical movement
from the landfill.' -39 In addition, the groups claimed that the present
plaintiffs did not represent their interests because they had failed to prop-
erly monitor migration of the contaminants in the Niagara River.
Several months later, the Province of Ontario and its Minister of the
Environment moved to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) or
in the alternative pursuant to Rule 24(b). 40 They asserted similar inter-
ests to those alleged by PPF and OCN (e.g. contamination of water and
fish). The Province and its Minister alleged that these interests were not
adequately represented because the "predominant concern of the existing
plaintiffs [was] with the water supplied to American citizens," 4 1 and not
with the contaminated water affecting Canadian citizens.
ETF, PPF, OCN and the Provincial officials presented oral argu-
ment on their motions to intervene on October 12, 1983. Several months
36. Hooker Chems., 749 F.2d at 973 (quoting the NEA's motion to intervene).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 974.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 975.
41. Id.
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later, the district court granted the Provincial officials motion to inter-
vene pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) stating that "it is not possible to be cer-
tain that the present parties will attach equal significance to what
Ontario views as its paramount interests-the prevention of the migra-
tion of chemicals into Lake Ontario and into the regional aquifer on the
Canadian side of the Niagara River."'42 However, the following month,
the district court denied the intervention motions of the environmental
groups. It held that the groups had not shown the United States, the
State of New York, and the Province of Ontario to be inadequate repre-
sentatives of their respective interests. Therefore, these groups could not
intervene under Rule 24(a)(2). 43
THE REASONING OF THE COURT
The central issue on appeal was the adequacy of the governmental
plaintiffs' representation. Before turning to this issue, the court devel-
oped the history of the federal rules governing intervention. 44 From this
discussion it concluded that
[t]he various components of the Rule are not bright lines, but
ranges.... A showing that a very strong interest exists may warrant
intervention upon a lesser showing of impairment or inadequacy of
representation. Similarly, where representation is clearly inadequate, a
lesser interest may suffice as a basis for granting intervention.45
Moreover, the court found that in addition to these stated requirements
for intervention, "common sense demands that consideration also be
given to matters that shape a particular action or particular type of
action."
46
A suit brought by the government is one example of a "particular
type of action" which should be considered along with the stated factors
for intervention in Rule 24(a)(2). In this context, the Second Circuit ex-
amined the district court's denial of the environmental groups' motion to
intervene. It agreed "with the district court that it is significant to the
42. Id. Prior to the order granting the Provincial authorities the right to intervene, the United
States, New York State, and the City of Niagara Falls had entered a proposed settlement agreement
on January 10, 1984.
43. Id. at 976.
44. Id. at 982-84. For a good discussion, see Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee.
1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 400-03 (1967);
see also United States v. City of Jackson, 519 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1975) (collecting cases); Shreve,
Questioning Intervention of Right Toward A New Methodology ofDecisionmaking, 74 Nw. U.L. REV.
894, 901-06 (1980). In City of Jackson, the court noted that "[t]he present language of Rule 24, a
product of 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules, was intended to overcome what was felt to be an
overly restrictive attitude toward intervention on the part of the courts." 519 F.2d at 1150.
45. Hooker Chems., 749 F.2d at 983.
46. Id.
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analysis required by Rule 24(a)(2) that the plaintiffs are governmental
entities suing on behalf of their citizens. '47 The court recognized that
when the State sues on behalf of its citizens, it acts as parens patriae.
Following decisions in other circuits,48 the court noted "that a gov-
ernment asserting its status as parens patriae deserves special considera-
tion when the issue is adequacy of representation. '49 The Second Circuit
agreed, finding that a party seeking to intervene in a parens patriae suit
must demonstrate a greater showing of inadequacy. In particular, the
court stated that the party seeking intervention must demonstrate "a
strong affirmative showing that the sovereign is not fairly representing
the interests of the applicant." 50
The environmental groups argued that only a minimal showing of
inadequacy is necessary to intervene. In making this argument, the
groups relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Trbovich v. United Mine
Workers.51 In that case, a union member, Trbovich, petitioned the Secre-
tary of Labor to institute a suit to set aside a union election. Subse-
quently, Trbovich moved to intervene in this suit, but the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals denied his motion. The Supreme Court re-
versed, stating that "[t]he requirement of the Rule [24(a)(2)] is satisfied if
the applicant shows that representation of his interest 'may be' inade-
quate; and the burden of making that showing should be treated as mini-
mal."' 52 The court allowed Trbovich to intervene because it had doubts
about the adequacy of the Secretary's representation since he was
charged with a duty to serve "two distinct interests" which will "not
always dictate precisely the same approach to the conduct of the
litigation."
53
Hooker Chemicals distinguished Trbovich on the ground that the
Secretary of Labor was not suing as a parens patriae, but rather as the
"lawyer" for the union members. Moreover, the court rejected the appli-
47. Id. at 984.
48. See cases cited supra at note 9.
49. Hooker Chem&, 749 F.2d at 984.
50. Id. at 986.
51. 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
52. Id. at 538 n.10.
53. Id. at 539; see also Shapiro, supra note 25, at 745 where the author commented that "[i]t
has been suggested that the tendency of an agency to sympathize with the interests of the industry it
regulates and to yield to improper pressures should be counteracted by the participation of repre-
sentatives of other interests, and of the public at large." Thus, it is possible to be caught between
conflicting obligations even in the absence of a statutory scheme imposing such a conflict. Cf.
United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 419 (D. Minn. 1972) where the court noted
that the United States as a "broad public" representative was charged with the obligation of repre-
senting varying interests. In such a role the United States would also be subject to conflicting
obligations.
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cability of Trbovich because the environmental groups "have not pointed
to anything like the conflicting statutory obligations imposed on the Sec-
retary in Trbovich to challenge this claim and thus to justify requiring
only a 'minimal' burden to show possible inadequate representation.
'54
Alternatively, the court found that intervention should be limited
because "[t]he emergency powers provisions confer 'broad authority' on
the Administrator to provide him with substantial flexibility needed to
prevent imminent hazards. 5 5 The court found that to liberally allow
intervention in such suits would delay remediation of an "imminent" pol-
lution hazard. Thus, in order to allow effective enforcement of this pro-




The Second Circuit's decision to limit intervention in RCRA immi-
nent hazard enforcement actions stands on three primary grounds. First,
the applicants for intervention in a parens patriae suit had not overcome
the presumption of adequate representation. Second, the applicants had
not demonstrated a "conflicting statutory obligation" on the part of the
governmental plaintiffs to justify the "minimal burden" standard of inad-
equacy applied in Trbovich. Third, liberal intervention in an imminent
hazard suit under RCRA would delay enforcement and frustrate the pur-
poses of the Act.
Hooker Chemicals raises some primary questions as to the relation-
ship between the government and the individual in a civil enforcement
action. This case requires a careful examination of the role of citizens in
complex suits to remedy the most serious hazardous waste sites threaten-
ing our health and property. This role is not easily defined; simply label-
ling a relationship should not be dispositive. Carefully balancing
competing policy concerns would have resulted in a fairer formula for
subsequent courts to follow as they rule on motions to intervene under
the amended imminent hazard provision of RCRA.
Parens Patriae Presumption of Adequacy
Hooker Chemicals devoted much of its opinion to the notion that
when the government brings a suit as parens patriae, it is presumed to
represent the interests of all its citizens. Logically, this notion is defec-
54. Hooker Chem&, 749 F.2d at 987.
55. Id. at 988.
56. Id. at 988-89.
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tive. While the government acting as parens patriae does, in an abstract
sense, represent all of its citizens' interest in a clean and safe environ-
ment, it does not necessarily represent the interests of the affected indi-
viduals or communities. 7 A person living near the S-area site or the
contaminated segments of the Niagara River has a direct personal stake
in the Hooker Chemicals dispute and in its resolution. This interest can-
not be equated with that of the government plaintiffs.
This issue of representation turns on the nature of the interest. For
those interests that affect all of its citizens equally 5 8 it makes sense to
presume the adequacy of the government's representation. Moreover,
the same holds true where the government and the individual have a
clear identity of interests. For example, when the government defends
governmental policies and practices, it is uniquely situated to represent
those who seek to intervene.5 9 In this type of situation, it can be said that
the government and the individual have the same ultimate objective.
Neither principle applies to individuals affected by hazardous waste
contamination. In a dispute involving hazardous waste contamination,
the extent of a person's legal interest will depend upon his geographical
proximity. All the citizens of the State of New York do not have an
equal interest in the migration of hazardous pollutants from the S-area
site. Obviously, those near the site will have a more vital interest than
those distant. Because the citizens of New York near the S-area site
contamination have a greater interest, it does not make sense to presume
that the governmental plaintiffs will adequately represent those interests
simply because they are acting in their capacity as parens patriae.
Alternatively, the government and the individual do not have an
identity of interests. While the governmental plaintiffs may generally
seek the same outcome as the environmental groups, there are a wide
range of means to reach similar ends. Hooker Chemicals disdainfully de-
scribed this divergence of views as "[t]he mere existence of disagreement
over some aspects of the remediation necessary to abate the hazard." 6
57. See Reserve Mining, 56 F.R.D. at 420. The court allowed intervention and noted that
the Court does not consider this to be a usurpation of the duties of the State of Michigan in
its capacity as parens patrie, but rather a supplementation of those duties by narrow repre-
sentation of specific interests. Conceptually, there should be no problem in allowing the
assertion of these narrow interests in the context of this particular litigation.
58. A prime example of that type of situation is when a State sues another State for a violation
of the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900); New Jersey v. New
York, 345 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1953) (per curiam).
59. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 505 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, Fire Officers
Union v. Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. 921 (1976) and text accompanying note 14 supra.
60. Hooker Chems., 749 F.2d at 987.
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This description obscures the potential for significant differences between
the governmental plaintiffs and the environmental groups.
Each of the environmental groups have a specific and narrowly de-
fined interest in the suit. For example, NEA seeks to insure the integrity
of the water treatment facility and protect the quality of the drinking
water. While this interest is also sought by the governmental plaintiffs, it
is one of many. 61 In reaching a settlement with Hooker, this interest may
get compromised. To presume the adequacy of the governmental plain-
tiff's representation again misidentifies the particular interest of an indi-
vidual environmental group with the general interest of the governmental
plaintiffs.
Delay In Enforcement As An Intervention Consideration
Another of the reasons for denying intervention in this imminent
hazard suit was to expedite enforcement. This rationale overlooks sev-
eral important considerations. At the time that the first environmental
group moved to intervene, the negotiations between Hooker and the gov-
ernmental plaintiffs had dragged on for close to three years. Subsequent
negotiations lasted another two years before the parties even reached a
tentative settlement. Though it is not possible to say that participation
by the environmental groups would have expedited the negotiations, it is
doubtful that such participation would have further delayed settlement.
Moreover, since the environmental groups are directly affected by
the "imminent hazard" migrating from the S-area site, they should seek a
quicker resolution; it is in the best interests of the different groups to
remedy the hazard quickly. In contrast, it is clearly in the interest of the
pollutor to stall negotiations in the hopes of wearing out the opposition.
Lastly, the court's claim that participation by the environmental
groups would delay enforcement overlooks the fact that parties with spe-
cial interests may be able to offer useful information otherwise unavaila-
ble to the court. This information may not only clarify the complex




Hooker Chemicals wrongfully applied the parens patriae presump-
61. See supra note 25; specifically, NEA proposed relocating the water treatment facility. In-
stead, the government proposed securing the intake area of the treatment plant. According to NEA,
its alternative to the proposed remedial action at the site had not been thoroughly considered.
62. Shapiro, supra note 25, at 745.
CLOSING COURTHOUSE DOOR TO INTERVENORS
tion of adequate representation to this imminent hazard enforcement ac-
tion. The interests in this suit are too varied to lend themselves to this
type of analysis. Intervention in hazardous waste litigation requires a
careful examination of the interests asserted, and the ability of the ex-
isting parties to represent those interests. Presuming the adequacy of a
party's representation, even if it is the government, may result in intoler-
able remediation of serious long term health hazards.
Instead, the court should have welcomed the perspective and direct
participation of those most affected by the S-area contaminants. Any
concern about delays caused by the proposed intervenors was probably
misplaced. Even if the environmental groups truly planned on disrupting
and delaying enforcement, the court could have limited their rights as
parties to the suit. This would have limited the possibility of any undue
delay.
Hooker Chemicals may present a formidable obstacle to future par-
ties as they attempt to intervene under the new RCRA amendment.
Most parties will not be able to meet the required showing of inadequacy.
Without the prod of citizen participation, "imminent hazard" suits may
drag on for many years in settlement negotiations. Those parties who are
directly affected by a hazardous waste problem should be allowed to rep-
resent their own interests so as to push settlement forward, or bring a
case to trial.
Finally, applying such a restrictive standard to motions for interven-
tion under RCRA will essentially frustrate Congress' new enforcement
scheme. By allowing citizens, either individually or in groups, the right
to intervene in imminent hazard suits, Congress intended that they
should play a role. The extent of that role has been left to the courts.
Presuming the adequacy of government representation precludes any
role at all in most cases.
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